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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
plaintiff accepted a risk whose consequences a reasonable man would have
perceived.' 8 Some of the facts, however, cast doubt on the inspector's fore-
sight of the danger in crossing the trench; he had uneventfully crossed it be-
fore, and his companion had immediately and safely preceded him over the
same trench. Finally, if one concedes, as the majority additionally stated, that
there may have been duty and violation on the defendant's part, should their
legal effect have been eliminated by the conduct of the plaintiff in this case?
Was the "carelessness" of the inspector of the degree found in other cases of
contributory negligence as a matter of law,19 or was it more analogous to the
conduct in worker accident cases left to determination of a jury?20 The deci-
sion may suggest a policy determination that the Court will henceforth hold
a specific class of plaintiffs who function daily in an area of many potential
dangers, such as a construction site, to a higher order of watchfulness for
their own safety than would be demanded of ordinary laymen.
(Mrs.) Josephine F. King
LIABILITY FOR DISABILITY FROM OCcUPATIONAL DISEASE COMMENCES WITH
MEDICAL TREATMENT EVEN WHEN THERE Is No Loss OF EARNINGS
In January the claimant, a lathe operator whose work included the
machining of both plastic and steel components, noticed a sore developing
under his right arm. About a week later a rash erupted on the top of both
hands, which subsequently spread to his face, neck and legs. On February 23,
he received his first medical treatment therefor, but continued working until
October. Medical testimony established that the rash was due to contact with
plastic resin at his work. The Workman's Compensation Board, confirming its
referee, fixed the date of disablement as February 23, with the result that
claimant would receive payment for his medical expenses from that date. The
Appellate Division reversed the Compensation Board so far as it bad required
payment to claimant of medical expenses incurred prior to the time of any
wage loss.' On appeal, held, award reinstated. The board may fix as the date
of "disablement" in an occupational disease case the time of physical impair-
ment or need of medical care prior to any loss of wages. Ryciak v. Eastern
Precision Resistor, 12 N.Y.2d 29, 186 N.E.2d 408, 234 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1962).
Forty-seven states now include "occupational diseases" within their work-
men's compensation statutes.2 Some states have included a definition of the
18. Zurich Gen'l Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 253 N.Y. 324, 171 N.E. 391(1930).
19. Townes v. Park Motor Sales, 7 A.D.2d 109, 180 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1st Dep't 1958),
aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 767, 163 NE.2d 142, 194 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1959) (memorandum decision);
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Amterdam Color Works Inc., 284 App. Div. 376, 131 N.Y.S.2d
782 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd, S08 N.Y. 816, 125 N.E.2d 871 (1955).
20. Kaplan v. 48th Av6. Corp., 267 App. Div. 272, 45 N.Y.S.2d 510 (2d Dep't 1943)(cited as authority in Grant v. United States 271 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1959)).
1. 15 A.D. 2d 609, 222 N.Y.S.2d 376 (3d Dep't 1961).
2. Alabama, Mississippi and Wyoming do not.
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term "occupational disease" in their statutes.3 Others, such as New York, have
left the term undefined. The common element running through the statutes
of the various states is that of the distinctive relation of the particular disease
to the nature of the employment. So that the term could generally be said
".. . to include any disease arising out of exposure to harmful conditions of
employment, when these conditions are present in a peculiar or increased
degree by comparison with employment generally." 4
While the New York Act does not attempt to define the term "occupa-
tional disease," only those diseases listed by the statute are compensable.5
Moreover, the claimant must establish that either death or disability has
resulted from the occupational disease0 and that the disease is attributable
to the nature of his employment before compensation will be awarded.7 Two
provisions of the New York statute bear on the question of disability. Section
37 stipulates that ". . . 'Disability' means the state of being disabled from
earning full wages at the work at which the employee was last employed."8
And section 42 provides that "'. . . the date of disablement shall be such date
as the board may determine on the hearing on the claim."9 In some New York
decisions, where awards granted by the board in occupational disease cases
were under review, the court has relied on section 37 as determining criterion
of a compensable disability.10 At the same time, other New York decisions
have avoided the inevitable result of adopting section 37 as a yardstick, by
citing section 42 as the foundation of their holding."' In its opinion in the
principal case, the Appellate Division relied on section 37, thus requiring a loss
of wages prior to compensable disability.:2
The Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision reversing the Appellate
Division, has made clear that in occupational disease cases section 37 is not
to be taken literally, but rather it is to be read in light of the reasonable
meaning of the entire statute.' 3 Referring to an earlier decision the Court
said: "Our decision in Matter of Slawinski . . . although without opinion,
3. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. tit. 65, § 65-42 (1952). ". . . the term 'occupational dis-
ease' means a disease arising out of and in the course of the employment. No ordinary
disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall be
compensable, except. . ." (the statute then lists two exceptions, followed by six factors
deemed to be determinative on the question whether a given disease did "arise out of the
employment.").
4. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 41.00 (1952).
5. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 3(2).
6. Id. § 39.
7. Id. § 40.
8. Id. § 37.
9. Id. § 42.
10. See, e.g., Harris v. Silver Creek Precision Corp., 13 A.D.2d 859, 214 N.Y.S.2d
911 (3d Dep't 1961); Muniak v. ACF Indus., Inc., 6 A.D.2d 923, 175 N.Y.S.2d 807 (3d
Dep't 1958).
11. Accord, Slawinski v. Williams & Co., 298 N.Y. 546, 81 N.E.2d 93 (1948) (with-
out opinion); Mastrodonato v. PfaudIer Co., 307 N.Y. 592, 123 N.E.2d 83 (1954); Cole
v. Saranac Lake Hosp., 282 App. Div. 626, 125 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1953).
12. 15 A.D.2d 609, 222 N.Y.S.2d 376 (3d Dep't 1961).
13. Instant case at 32, 186 N.E.2d at 409, 234 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
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necessarily rejected the statutory constructions approved by the Appellate
Division in the present case, and meant as to an occupational disease claim
that the employee's right to compensation and the employer's corresponding
liability accrue no later than the date when the illness requires medical atten-
tion."'14 Moreover, the Court recently held that where a true "accident" situa-
tion is present, the requirement of medical care is indicative of a disability in
itself regardless of a financial impairmentr
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, relying on section 42, takes cogni-
zance of the flexibility granted the board by that section, as a basis for cir-
cumventing the loss-of-wage-test where medical evidence has shown a dis-
ability prior to a diminution in earning power. If, on the other hand, the
construction emphasized by the Appellate Division were adopted, the em-
ployer's payroll record would necessarily dictate the date of disablement, there-
by leaving section 42 a meaningless appendage. Moreover, the Appellate Divi-
sion construction, if adopted, would be against the public interest, as it compels
the sufferer of an occupational disease who might desire to continue working
to quit work in order to get his medical bills paid. In fact, it was the Appellate
Division which, in an earlier case reviewing the legislative history of sections
37 and 42 pointed out, that the legislature in 1922, left section 37 as it was,
but rewrote the present section 42 such that the board "may determine" the
date of disablement. This is indicative of the legislature's intent to allow the
board some latitude in settling a controversey. The Court's decision in the
instant case, enlarging the scope of workman's compensation is in line with
the liberal trend of the majority of the New York decisions.' 0
Ronald L. Fancher
APPLICABILITY OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN BREACH OF WARRANTY AND
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
In 1944 plaintiff was injected with a radiopaque chemical. Some of the
substance allegedly remained in his body causing a cascinoma to develop which
required an eye to be removed in 1957. Two years later plaintiff commenced
an action for breach of warranty and negligence against the manufacturer.
From a dismissal of the action by the Supreme Court, Special Term as time
barred,' and a unanimous affirmance by the Appellate Division,2 plaintiff ap-
14. Ibid.
15. Mastrodonato v. Pfaudler Co., 307 N.Y. 592, 597, 123 N.E.2d 83, 86 (1954).
16. See, e.g., Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950);
Kilmas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14
(1961) (heart attack victim); for a case decided since the instant case, cf., Hooper v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 12 N.Y.2d 767, 186 N.E.2d 565, 234 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1962).
1. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 30 Misc. 2d 663, 219 N.Y.S.2d 98
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
2. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 15 A.D.2d 650, 224 N.Y.S.2d 270
(1st Dep't 1962).
